Keep Your Friends Close and Your Medical Records Closer: Defining the Extent to Which a Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy Protects Medical Records by Newman, Lauren
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Masthead Logo
Journal of Law and Health Law Journals
5-1-2019
Keep Your Friends Close and Your Medical
Records Closer: Defining the Extent to Which a
Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy
Protects Medical Records
Lauren Newman
Georgia State University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/jlh
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Privacy Law
Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
of Law and Health by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lauren Newman, Keep Your Friends Close and Your Medical Records Closer: Defining the Extent to Which a Constitutional Right to
Informational Privacy Protects Medical Records, 32 J.L. & Health 1 (2019)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/jlh/vol32/iss1/5
  
 
1 
KEEP YOUR FRIENDS CLOSE AND YOUR 
MEDICAL RECORDS CLOSER: DEFINING THE 
EXTENT TO WHICH A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTS 
MEDICAL RECORDS 
 
LAUREN NEWMAN, GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, J.D. 2019 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 2 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL 
  PRIVACY ........................................................................................................... 6 
II. TO PROTECT OR NOT TO PROTECT: THE SECOND CIRCUIT VS. THE 
  THIRD CIRCUIT ............................................................................................... 11 
        A.    The Second Circuit’s Limited Protection Approach .............................. 12 
     1.   “Serious” and “Embarrassing” are Ambiguous Terms .................... 13 
     2.   “Serious” and “Embarrassing” are Subject to Evolve ...................... 15 
     3.    Jurors and Judges are Not Equipped to Determine the 
            Seriousness of a Condition .............................................................. 15 
        B.    The Third Circuit’s More Liberal Approach .......................................... 16 
           1.   Medical Information is Generally Afforded Greater Protection ....... 17 
           2.   Private and Sensitive are not Synonymous ....................................... 18 
III.  MEDICAL PRIVACY GOING FORWARD ............................................................ 19 
        A.    Courts Should Protect All Medical Information .................................... 19 
           1.   Courts Should Incentivize Safeguarding Against Inadvertent 
                 Information Disclosures Rather than Excuse Them ......................... 20 
           2.   Protecting all Medical Information Simplifies the Courts’ 
                 Balancing Test .................................................................................. 23 
           3.   Patients May be Less Forthcoming if They are Unsure Whether 
                 Their Information is Protected .......................................................... 23 
       B.   Congress Should Amend the Privacy Act to Permit Recovery for 
             Emotional Distress .................................................................................... 24 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 32:1] 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Traditionally, an individual’s personal records were beyond the government’s 
grasp absent a showing of probable cause.1 The legal standards that protected them 
“evolved in a world where such records were almost universally in the actual 
possession of the individual.”2 However, with today’s ever-expanding use of 
technology3 and the ease with which highly intimate and sensitive information may be 
acquired and compiled,4 that world no longer exists.5 Instead, the magnitude of 
information sharing in the digital age has led to private, personal records not feeling 
very private at all.  
In an attempt to safeguard health information, Congress enacted the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 1996.6 Specifically, the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule prohibits the “inappropriate use and disclosure of [health] 
information.”7 Notably absent, however, is a private right of action.8 Thus, an 
“individual whose information is improperly used or disclosed, according to HIPAA, 
has no recourse” despite the “irreversible emotional and financial harm” caused by 
privacy violations.9 In an attempt to provide a remedy to victims of sensitive data 
breaches, some state courts have allowed HIPAA to inform the applicable standard of 
                                                           
1 THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION 
SOCIETY 347 (July 1977).  
2 Id.  
3 Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.  283, 
302 (2003) (“While digital technology can save money and allow life-saving medical 
information to be instantly sent between hospitals and doctors, the same technology also 
heightens the possibility of mistake or misuse.”) Devin W. Ness, Information Overload: Why 
Omnipresent Technology and the Rise of Big Data Shouldn’t Spell the End for Privacy as We 
Know It, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 925, 926 (“[T]he rapid development of information 
technology in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has had a massive impact on most 
people’s daily lives, especially in regard to personal communications, access to information, 
and information transport and storage.”) 
4 GRANT S. MCCLELLAN, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 164–65 (1976) (recognizing two trends 
which have made it easy for medical records—at one point secure and privately stored in 
doctors’ offices or hospitals—to be taken out and forwarded without consent: “the great surge 
in computer technology” and “the growth of ‘third party’ involvement in health matters” such 
as insurance or the Medical Information Bureau) 
5 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 
(1890) (“Later there came a recognition of a man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and his 
intellect. Gradually the scope of these legal rights broadened . . . and the term ‘property’ has 
grown to comprise every form of possession—intangible, as well as tangible.”). 
6 24 C.F.R. § 164.303 (1996). 
7 Austin Rutherford, Byrne: Closing the Gap Between HIPAA and Patient Privacy, 53 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 201, 202 (2016). 
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
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care in negligence cases.10 Other states have enacted legislation to regulate the 
“privacy, confidentiality, security, use, and disclosure of information.”11  
Despite these preliminary steps, the primary focus has been on private data 
breaches, leaving breaches in the U.S. public sector without “the attention [they] 
deserve[].”12 Like hospitals, doctors’ offices, and pharmacies, the government holds 
large volumes of sensitive data.13 Unlike privately held data, however, the government 
obtains this information through “coercive or unbargained-for” means.”14 
Specifically, they obtain it through either: (1) requiring disclosures by law “(e.g. tax 
returns, the census, law enforcement);” or (2) “in connection with an activity for which 
there is no realistic alternative source or supplier (e.g. licensing or benefits).”15 A 
number of states have employed the former method to require medical facilities to 
disclose personal health information when it furthers a state interest.16 For example, 
Georgia—in response to the current opioid epidemic—passed House Bill 249 in 2017, 
requiring prescribers to enter patients’ prescription information for Schedule II, III, 
IV, and V controlled substances in a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program 
(PDMP).17 The PDMP, which falls under the purview of the Georgia Department of 
Public Health, gives providers the ability to review patients’ history of filled 
prescriptions over the last two years.18   
But what if the PDMP gets hacked? Or what if a Department of Public Health 
employee leaves his work laptop on the bus? The individuals who were prescribed 
certain controlled substances would have their private data in the public domain. They 
would “suffer torment, anxiety, and financial and emotional stress wondering if and 
when this information will be used against them.”19 Hackers may even be able to “open 
credit cards, take out loans, [or] fraudulently obtain tax returns.”20 Yet, these patients 
can’t sue under HIPAA. Moreover, they likely cannot sue under state law as state and 
                                                           
10 See, e.g., Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 102 A.3d 32, 42 (Conn. 
2014) (“HIPAA regulations may well inform the applicable standard of care in certain 
circumstances.”).  
11 Jean O’Connor & Gene Matthews, Informational Privacy, Public Health, and State Laws, 
101 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH (Oct. 2011).  
12 A. Michael Froomkin, Government Data Breaches, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1019, 1020 
(June 2009). 
13  Id. at 1022 (“Governments hold a wide variety of data.”). 
14 Id. at 1019–20. 
15 Id. at 1025. 
16 WILLIAM H. ROACH JR., MEDICAL RECORDS AND THE LAW 131 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing 
state statutes requiring disclosure of patient health information dealing with controlled drug 
prescriptions and occupational diseases); see, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS CH. 94C § 9(d) (1993).  
17 J. Patrick O’Neil, Important Message from the Commissioner, GA. DEP’T OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH (Oct. 18, 2017), https://dph.georgia.gov/sites/dph.georgia.gov/files/related_files/ 
document/DrONeal_PDMP_Deadline_Letter.pdf. 
18 Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, GA. DEPT’ OF PUBLIC HEALTH (Aug. 23, 2018), 
https://dph.georgia.gov/pdmp.  
19 Rutherford, supra note 7, at 202. 
20 Id. 
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federal governments enjoy sovereign immunity.21 The government is shielded from 
liability, unless and until state or federal legislatures abrogate that immunity for state 
privacy claims.22 Fortunately for these individuals, however, this immunity does not 
protect the government from all claims.23 An individual whose information has been 
improperly acquired or disseminated by a governmental actor may still look to two 
sources for agency liability: the Federal Privacy Act24 or the Constitution.25 Due to the 
shortcomings of the Privacy Act and the Supreme Court’s “restrict[ion] on the ability 
of individuals to recover damages for a violation of the Act,”26 this Article primarily 
focuses on the constitutional right to informational privacy.27  
While the Constitution does not explicitly provide a right to privacy,28 a number 
of Supreme Court decisions have recognized that the right may exist.29 In an attempt 
to clarify its scope, the Court in Whalen v. Roe declared that there are two types of 
privacy interests: “security of personal information and autonomy in making 
important decisions.”30 Although the Supreme Court has confronted decisional 
privacy many times,31 the contours of the right to informational privacy continue to 
                                                           
21 Froomkin, supra note 12, at 1028. 
22 See, e.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) ("The immunity from suit belonging to 
a State, which is respected and protected by the Constitution within the limits of the judicial 
power of the United States, is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure.”). 
23 Id.  
24 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2016). The Privacy Act is “the most ambitious piece of federal legislation 
in the domain of informational privacy,” and “the most comprehensive law that regulates the 
processing and dissemination of information that the government collects about individuals.” 
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2024 (2010).  
25 Caleb Seeley, Once More Unto the Breach: The Constitutional Right to Informational 
Privacy and the Privacy Act, N.Y.U. L. REV. 1335, 1358 (Nov. 2016).   
26 Id. at 1358 (“[T]he Court’s narrow interpretation of ‘actual damages’ in the Privacy Act in 
FAA v. Cooper restricted the ability of individuals to recover damages for a violation of the 
Act.”).  
27 Helen L. Gilbert, Minors’ Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1374, 1375 (2007).  
28 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (“The Constitution does not explicitly mention any 
right of privacy.”); Seeley, supra note 25, at 1359 (“The Constitution does not explicitly 
mention a right to privacy.”)  
29 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (recognizing a fundamental “right to be 
free . . . from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 8–9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (recognizing that the Fourth 
Amendment “protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion.”); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965) (Goldberg, J. concurring); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).  
30 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977); see also Gilbert, supra note 27, at 1375. 
31 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (2007) (addressing decisional privacy 
with contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (addressing decisional privacy 
with marriage); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (addressing decisional 
privacy with family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942) 
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elude courts.32 In fact, the Supreme Court has yet to expressly extend the right to 
privacy to informational privacy despite confronting the issue twice since Whalen.33 
Despite the Court’s restraint to rule on the existence of the right, every circuit court 
with the exception of the D.C. Circuit34 has interpreted Whalen as establishing such a 
right to informational privacy.35 Although these courts unanimously refuse to extend 
the right absolutely, each court varies as to what medical information it protects.36  
The following Article discusses the extent to which the constitutional right to 
informational privacy protects medical data from improper acquisition or 
dissemination by state agents.37 Part I provides background on Whalen v. Roe, the 
Supreme Court case that has been understood to establish the right to informational 
privacy.38 Part I also discusses the variations across the circuit courts as to what 
                                                           
(addressing decisional privacy with procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 
535 (1925) (addressing decisional privacy with child rearing).  
32 Gilbert, supra note 27, at 1375.   
33  NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011) (“We assume, without deciding, that the 
Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort mentioned in Whalen [v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 
(1977)] and Nixon [v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977)].”); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. 
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (referring to a constitutional “interest in avoiding disclosure.”); 
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605 (recognizing that in some circumstances, the duty to avoid unwarranted 
disclosures of private data “arguably has its roots in the Constitution.”); Christopher R. Smith, 
Somebody’s Watching Me: Protecting Patient Privacy in Prescription Health Information, 36 
VT. L. REV. 951, 953 (2012) (“Whalen was the Supreme Court’s last examination of the 
constitutional right to privacy within the context of PHI, and it left unanswered thee question of 
whether or not patients have a right to privacy in . . . PHI.”); Gilbert, supra note 27, at 1375. 
34 American Federation of Govt. Employees v. HUD, 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
35 Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]here exists in the United States 
Constitution a right to privacy protecting “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters”); Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 72 F.3d 1133, 1138 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (“The district court, therefore, committed no error in its holding that there is a 
constitutional right to privacy in one’s prescription records.”); Doe v. City of New York, 15 
F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[w]e therefore hold that Doe possesses a constitutional right to 
confidentiality under Whalen in his HIV status.”); see also ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE 
KENNEDY (SMALL CAPS?), THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 142 (1995) (“The Supreme Court has not 
addressed the issue again, but following Whalen, a number of lower federal courts recognized 
a privacy interest in confidential medical information, including medical records. They also 
began to fashion a framework by which to balance an individual’s privacy rights against the 
government’s need for access to and disclosure of some personal information.”); Seeley, 
supra note 25, at 935, 1365 (“Nine circuits recognize a constitutional right to privacy in 
personal information, health or otherwise.”). 
36 Matson v. Bd. of Educ. Of City Sch. Dist. Of N.Y., 631 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming 
trial court’s finding that teacher did not enjoy constitutionally-protected privacy right as to her 
fibromyalgia); SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1138 (“While individuals have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in their prescription purchase of controlled substances, such right must be weighed 
against the state’s interest in monitoring the use of dangerously addictive drugs”); Smith, supra 
note 33, at 953 (noting that “the question of the scope of the constitutional right to privacy in 
one’s medical information is largely unresolved”). 
37 Smith, supra note 33, at 953. 
38 See infra Part I.  
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medical information is afforded protection by the right.39 Part II analyzes the well-
established approaches adopted by the Second and Third Circuits as they present 
opposing interpretations of Whalen, one wholly protecting medical information and 
the other protecting scarcely any.40 Finally, Part III explains why the Supreme Court 
and courts that have yet to adopt a uniform approach should follow the Third Circuit 
and constitutionally protect all medical information from improper government 
acquisition or dissemination.41 Part III also argues for an amendment to the Privacy 
Act to provide individuals whose medical conditions are not afforded protection under 
the Constitution an alternative remedy.42 
 
I.    THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL 
PRIVACY 
 
In 1977, the Supreme Court arguably recognized a constitutional right to 
informational privacy, though it refused to expand its holding beyond the facts of the 
case.43 In Whalen v. Roe, the state of New York responded to the concern that drugs 
were being diverted into unlawful channels by enacting a statute that required doctors 
to disclose to the state information regarding patients being prescribed certain drugs 
with a high potential for abuse.44 These disclosures would include information such as 
the patient’s name, address, and age.45 In its opinion, the majority delineated two kinds 
of privacy interests: the “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” and “the 
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”46 The 
privacy interest dealing with the nondisclosure of medical records falls within the first 
category.47 Ultimately, the Court held that the patient-identification requirement in the 
New York statute was insufficient to “constitute an invasion of any right or liberty 
protected by the [Constitution].”48 It reasoned that the requirement was furthering a 
                                                           
39 See infra Part I.  
40 See infra Part II.  
41 See infra Part III.  
42 See infra Part III.  
43 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1977) (recognizing in “some circumstances” the 
duty to avoid “unwarranted disclosures” of personal information in computerized data banks 
or government files “arguably has its roots in the Constitution”). 
44 Id. at 589.  
45 Id.   
46 Id. at 599–600; see also United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d 
Cir. 1980) (“[W]e know that [the constitutional protection of the right to privacy] extends to 
two types of privacy interests” and “[t]he privacy interest asserted in [medical records] case[s] 
falls within the first category referred to in Whalen, the right not to have an individual’s 
private affairs made public by the government.”).  
47 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577 (“The privacy interest asserted in this case [privacy in medical 
records] falls within the first category referred to in Whalen v. Roe, the right not to have an 
individual's private affairs made public by the government.”).  
48 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603–04; see also ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 35 at 141–42 
(“Although the New York law was upheld, Whalen was considered a milestone in the fight for 
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legitimate state interest and that disclosure of medical information can be “an essential 
part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure may reflect unfavorably on 
the character of the patient.”49  
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan argued that despite the majority’s 
holding, future technological developments would ultimately require additional 
restrictions as such developments may vastly increase the potential for abuse of easily 
accessible computerized information.50 Forty years and countless technological 
advances later,51 the scope of constitutional restrictions on informational privacy 
remains unclear.52 Circuit and district courts interpreting Whalen unanimously permit 
acquisition and disclosure of medical information when the government’s interest in 
propagating the information outweighs the individual’s interest in keeping the 
information private.53 However, most courts do not even reach this balancing test if 
they determine the information is not of a constitutionally protected dimension.54 This 
conclusion begs the question: what medical information is constitutionally protected? 
The Second Circuit extends the constitutional right to privacy to serious, fatal 
conditions and profound psychiatric conditions that impart on their victims 
                                                           
privacy. The recognition of a constitutionally protected interest in certain personal information 
was important, as was the recognition of the vulnerability of information in the electronic 
era.”). 
49 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602 (“disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital 
personnel, to insurance companies, and to public health agencies”); see also MCCLELLAN, 
supra note 4, at 162 (“Hippocrates’ ‘holy secrets,’ traditionally guarded by doctor and patient, 
are now often noised about and with some peculiar results. The medical examination room is 
getting crowded. You think you are talking to your doctor, but insurance companies, lawyers, 
future educators or employers, researchers—even credit bureaus—may be listening in.”).  
50 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603–04 (Brennan, J. concurring) (“What is more troubling about this 
scheme, however, is the central computer storage of the data thus collected.”). 
51 Jim Atherton, Development of the Electronic Health Record, 13 AMA J. OF ETHICS 186, 188 
(“Since the 1980s, more concerted efforts have been made to increase use of EHR.”).  
52 See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (“Although the full measure of the constitutional 
protection of the right to privacy has not yet been delineated . . . ”); Philip Kurland, The 
Private I, THE UNIV. OF CHICAGO MAG. 7, 8 (1976) (“The concept of a constitutional right of 
privacy still remains largely undefined.”). 
53 SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1138 (“As with many individual rights, the right of privacy in one’s 
prescription drug records must be balanced against important competing interests.”); Doe, 15 
F.3d at 269 (“[T]he city’s interest in disseminating information concerning conciliation 
agreements must be ‘substantial’ and must be balanced against Doe’s right to 
confidentiality.”); Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (“In recognition that the right of an 
individual to control access to her or his medical history is not absolute, courts and 
legislatures have determined that public health or other public concerns may support access to 
facts an individual might otherwise choose to withhold.”).  
54 Lee v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 636 F.3d 245, 260 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Only after a 
fundamental right is identified should the court proceed to the next step of the analysis—the 
balancing of the government’s interest in disseminating the information against the 
individual’s interest in keeping the information private.”); Ortlieb v. Howery, 74 F. App’x 
853, 857 (10th Cir. 2003) (refusing to consider whether the government’s interest outweighed 
the plaintiff’s right to privacy where plaintiff had no right to privacy in her x-rays).  
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“discrimination and intolerance.”55 In Doe v. City of New York, the court found that 
individuals infected with HIV “clearly possess[] a constitutional right to privacy 
regarding their condition” given its seriousness and fatality.56 The court further 
reasoned that an individual’s revelation that he has HIV “potentially exposes [him] 
not to understanding or compassion but to discrimination and intolerance, further 
necessitating the extension of the right to confidentiality.”57  
Based on the reasoning laid out in Doe, the Second Circuit extended the 
constitutional right to privacy to transsexualism in Powell v. Schriver.58 The court 
focused on transsexualism’s “excruciatingly private and intimate nature,” its status as 
a “profound psychiatric disorder,” and its vulnerability to discrimination and 
intolerance.59 However, in Matson v. Board of Education Of City School Dist. of New 
York, the Second Circuit declined to extend the right it so established in Doe and 
Powell to patients with fibromyalgia.60 The Court reasoned that fibromyalgia, however 
serious, is neither fatal nor a profound psychiatric disorder.61  
The Third Circuit protects “those [rights of privacy] which are ‘fundamental’ or 
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”62 In United States v. Westinghouse 
Electric Corporation, the court held that medical records containing “results of routine 
testing, such as X-rays, blood tests, pulmonary function tests, [and] hearing and visual 
tests” are unquestionably “well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy 
protection.”63 The court again protected medical records, specifically records of 
prescription medications, in Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 
Authority (SEPTA).64 Thus, despite imposing what may seem a fairly stringent 
                                                           
55 Matson, 631 F.2d at 65–69 (emphasis omitted) (finding that “although fibromyalgia is a 
serious medical condition, it does not carry with it the sort of opprobrium that confers upon 
those who suffer from it a constitutional right of privacy as to that medical condition); Powell, 
175 F.3d at 111 (concluding the reasoning in Doe “compels the conclusion that the 
Constitution does indeed protect the right to maintain the confidentiality of one’s 
transsexualism”); Doe, 15 F.3d at 267 (finding plaintiff possessed a confidential right to 
confidentiality under Whalen in his HIV status). 
56 Doe, 15 F.3d at 266. 
57 Id. at 267; see also JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND 
THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 130 (1997) (“Disclosure of [medical] information . . . can be not 
only embarrassing but can lead to discrimination, loss of employment, and financial loss.”).  
58 Powell, 175 F.3d at 112 (Like the HIV status discussed in Doe, “transsexualism is the 
unusual condition that is likely to provoke both an intense desire to preserve one’s medical 
confidentiality, as well as hostility and intolerance from others.”). 
59 Powell, 175 F.3d at 111. 
60 Matson, 631 F.2d at 64–65 (explaining that “[a] general medical determination or 
acknowledgment that a disease is serious does not give rise ipso facto to a constitutionally-
protected privacy right”).  
61 Id. (noting that despite being characterized by “fatigue and muscular soreness and 
tenderness”, fibromyalgia is only debilitating in certain instances).  
62 SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1137 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)).  
63 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577. 
64 SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1140. 
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standard, requiring the plaintiff’s right to nondisclosure of her information be 
“fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of liberty,” the Third Circuit seems to 
broadly consider the nondisclosure of all medical information to be of such a 
fundamental nature to warrant its protection.  
With arguably the narrowest interpretation of Whalen, the Sixth Circuit 
“developed and applied a different approach to assessing information privacy claims” 
than its sister circuits. 65 The court, like the Third Circuit, only extends a right to 
privacy to interests that can be deemed “fundamental or implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.”66 However unlike the Third Circuit, the Sixth Circuit is yet to 
“confront[] circumstances involving the disclosure of medical records” that are 
“tantamount to the breach of a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ under the Constitution.”67 
Instead it has ruled that the disclosure of medical records,68 DNA profiles,69 
psychotherapy records,70 and one’s status as HIV positive71 do not rise to the level of 
a breach of a right recognized as fundamental under the Constitution. The Sixth Circuit 
has only recognized constitutionally protected informational-privacy interest twice: 
(1) where the release of personal information could lead to bodily harm;72 and (2) 
where the information released was of a sexual, personal, and humiliating nature.73 
                                                           
65 Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 442 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Lee, 636 F.3d at 261 
(“This court, in contrast to some of our sister circuits, ‘has narrowly construed the holdings of 
Whalen and Nixon to extend the right to information privacy only to interests that implicate a 
fundamental liberty interest.’”); Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 
566, 574 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Since DeSanti, this Court has not strayed from its holding, and 
continues to evaluate privacy claims based on whether the interest sought to be protected is a 
fundamental interest or an interest implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”). 
66 Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 683 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 
1090 (6th Cir. 1981).  
67 Lee, 636 F.3d at 261.  
68 Summe v. Kenton Cnty. Clerk’s Office, 604 F.3d 257, 270–71 (6th Cir. 2010); Jarvis v. 
Wellman, 52 F.3d 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1995) (prison officials’ disclosure of rape victim’s 
medical records to an inmate “does not rise to the level of a breach of a right recognized as 
‘fundamental’ under the Constitution”); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Dir. of Nat’l Inst. For 
Occupational Safety and Health, 636 F.2d 163, 165–66 (6th Cir. 1980) (enforcing a subpoena 
for the production of employees’ medical records finding no intrusion upon protected privacy 
interests).  
69 Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 428–29 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding plaintiff did not have a 
fundamental privacy interest in information contained in his DNA profile). 
70 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 641 (6th Cir. 1983) (affirming enforcement of a subpoena 
issued by a grand jury, commanding psychotherapists to produce patient information). 
71 Doe v. Lockwood, No. 95-3499, 1996 WL 367046, at *6 (6th Cir. June 27, 1996); Doe v. 
Wiggington, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994). 
72 Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1069–70 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
disclosure of officers’ personal information placed them and their families at substantial risk of 
serious bodily harm and thus encroached upon their “fundamental rights to privacy and personal 
security under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
73 Bloch, 156 F.3d at 683 (concluding that rape victims have a fundamental right of privacy as 
to the intimate details of their rapes reasoning “such basic matters as contraception, abortion, 
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Thus, despite using the exact same test—or perhaps more appropriately, the exact 
same verbiage of a test—to determine whether information is constitutionally 
protected, the Sixth and Third Circuits have vastly different interpretations of what is 
“fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”74  
The Tenth Circuit protects information when “the party asserting the right has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy” in the information.75 In considering whether 
someone’s expectation of privacy in a medical condition is reasonable, the court 
examines the personal nature of the condition and only extends protection to highly 
personal or sensitive data.76 Under this approach, the Tenth Circuit has extended the 
right to privacy to HIV,77 prescription drug records,78 and medical records.79 However, 
it has refused to protect X-rays, reasoning that they contain no information of a 
sensitive or intimate nature about which an individual could form a legitimate 
expectation of privacy; it is plainly obvious when someone has a broken limb to 
anyone who witnessed the accident or sees her cast.80 Thus, while Tenth Circuit 
decisions claim to protect only information of the utmost sensitive nature, in practice, 
the Tenth Circuit considers most medical information sensitive and thus private 
enough to warrant protection.81 The only information the Tenth Circuit appears to 
                                                           
marriage, and family life are protected by the constitution from unwarranted government 
intrusion.”). 
74 SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1138 (“When the underlying claim is one of invasion of privacy, the 
complaint must be ‘limited to those [rights of privacy] which are “fundamental” or “implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty.”’”) (quoting Davis, 424 U.S. at 713); Lee, 636 F.3d at 260 
(“A plaintiff alleging a violation of her right to informational privacy must therefore 
demonstrate ‘that the interest at take relates to “those personal rights that can be deemed 
fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”’”) (quoting DeSanti, 653 F.2d at 
1090). 
75 Ortlieb, 74 F. App’x at 856; see also Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(“The Due Process Clause directly protects fundamental aspects of personal privacy against 
intrusion by the State. One aspect of this substantive due process arises from the individual 
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. Due process thus implies an assurance of 
confidentiality with respect to certain forms of personal information possessed by the state.”).  
76 Ortlieb, 74 Fed. App’x at 857 (citing Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1570 (10th Cir. 
1989)) (“[To] determin[e] whether information . . . is of such a highly personal or sensitive 
nature that it falls within the zone of confidentiality . . . the court must consider, (1) if the 
party asserting the right has a legitimate expectation of privacy, (2) if disclosure serves a 
compelling state interest, and (3) if disclosure can be made in the least intrusive manner.”). 
77 A.L.A. v. West Valley City, 26 F.3d 989, 990 (10th Cir. 1994) (“There is no dispute that 
confidential medical information is entitled to constitutional privacy.”).  
78 Douglas v. Dobbs, 419 F.3d 1097, 1102 (10th Cir. 2005) (establishing that plaintiff had a 
constitutional right to privacy in her prescription drug records as an individual using 
prescription drugs has a reasonable expectation of such information remaining private).  
79 Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 479-80 (10th Cir. 1994) (There is “no question 
that an employee’s medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are 
well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection.”).  
80 Ortlieb, 74 Fed. App’x at 857 (“[T]here was nothing confidential about the fact that Ms. 
Ortlieb had a severely broken leg.”).  
81 Lankford, 27 F.3d at 479–80. 
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exclude from constitutional protection are those conditions discernable to the naked 
eye.82  
This brief overview of the relevant case law evinces the inconsistency with which 
the circuit courts extend the constitutional right to informational privacy in the 
healthcare arena. Medical records, for example, are “well within the ambit of materials 
entitled privacy protection” in the Third83 and the Tenth Circuits,84 whereas the Sixth 
Circuit refuses to categorically protect them.85 Routine testing and X-rays are similarly 
protected in the Third Circuit86 but not in the Tenth Circuit.87 An individual’s HIV 
status is constitutionally protected in the Second and Third Circuits but not in the Sixth 
Circuit.88 With such sharp divergence in the circuit courts’ interpretations of what 
information is constitutionally protected under Whalen, individuals seeking to prevent 
disclosure of the same medical condition face conflicting outcomes entirely depending 
on where they live.  
 
II.    TO PROTECT OR NOT TO PROTECT: THE SECOND CIRCUIT VS. THE THIRD 
CIRCUIT 
 
Until the Supreme Court adopts a uniform approach, courts with little to no 
precedent must look to those courts that have sufficiently addressed the issue of 
informational privacy for guidance.89 This analysis focuses on the approaches adopted 
by the Second and Third Circuits as these courts present robust case law and opposing 
views on what medical information is protected under the Constitution.  
 
 
 
                                                           
82 Ortlieb, 74 Fed. App’x at 857. 
83 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578. 
84 Lankford, 27 F.3d at 479-80 (There is “no question that an employee’s medical records, 
which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials 
entitled to privacy protection.”).  
85 Lee, 636 F.3d at 261.  
86 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.  
87 Ortlieb, 74 Fed. App’x at 857 (finding x-rays were not intimate or personal enough for the 
plaintiff to possibly “form a legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy”).  
88 SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1138; Doe, 15 F.2d at 267 (“We therefore hold that Doe possesses a 
constitutional right to confidentiality under Whalen in his HIV status”); but see Wiggington, 
21 F.3d at 740 (finding inmate possessed no constitutionally right to privacy in his HIV 
status).  
89 Paul Nordeman, The Vanishing Right to Privacy: A Critique of the Second Circuit’s 
Approach to Medical Confidentiality in Matson v. Board of Education, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 225, 234 (2011) (“As courts continue to confront matters implicating individuals’ 
privacy rights about personal medical information, they will look to previous decisions for 
guidance.”). 
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A.   The Second Circuit’s Limited Protection Approach 
 
The Second Circuit imposes one of the most stringent standards of the circuit 
courts and only extends the right to privacy to serious, fatal medical conditions and 
profound psychiatric disorders. It additionally requires that the condition “bring about 
public opprobrium.”90 Thus, in considering whether a constitutional right to privacy 
attaches to various medical conditions, the Second Circuit proceeds on a case-by-case 
basis that will “necessarily include certain medical conditions [and] exclude others.”91 
Under this approach, the Second Circuit has extended the right to privacy to HIV,92 
transsexualism,93 and a person’s psychiatric health and substance-abuse history.94 A 
district court has also extended the right to privacy to sickle cell anemia.95 Other courts 
in the Second Circuit have refused, however, to extend the right to less serious 
conditions.96 This bar, higher than those imposed by the Third and Tenth Circuits, 
forces plaintiffs to prove their ailment is of such an embarrassing and serious degree 
in order to receive constitutional protection.97 While this threshold may disincentive 
plaintiffs from bringing claims to redress the disclosure of less significant conditions, 
it imposes a number of difficulties in terms of its enforcement.  
 
 
 
                                                           
90 Id. at 66; Nordeman, supra note 89, at 234 (“The Matson Court . . . considered both the 
seriousness of Dorrit Matson’s condition and the amount of discrimination she was likely to 
face because of her fibromyalgia.”); see DeVries, supra note 3, at 302 (“Having the world 
learn about one’s Prozac prescription can be embarrassing; having the world learn about one’s 
HIV-positive status can be life-shattering.”).  
91 Matson, 631 F.3d at 67. 
92 Doe, 15 F.3d at 267. 
93 Powell, 175 F.3d at 111; Nordeman, supra notes 89, at 231 (“The Second Circuit had 
previously given that designation only to HIV and transsexualism.”).  
94 O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Medical information in 
general, and information about a person’s psychiatric health and substance-abuse history in 
particular, is information of the most intimate kind.”).  
95 Fleming v. State Univ. of N.Y., 502 F. Supp. 2d 324, 342-45 (2d. Cir. 2007); Nordeman, 
supra notes 89, at 231.  
96 Matson, 631 F.3d at 67 (refusing to extend the right of privacy to fibromyalgia); Watson v. 
Wright, 08-CV-62, 2010 WL 55932, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2010) (“This [c]ourt finds no basis 
in Powell and its progeny for holding that, in a prison setting, plaintiff's Hepatitis C condition 
is the type of condition that gives rise to constitutional protection under Powell.”); Rush v. 
Artuz, No. 00 Civ. 3436, 2004 WL 1770064, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2004) (“First, plaintiff's 
wrist injury and his stomach problems cannot be classified as ‘personal matters of a sensitive 
nature’ and second, due to his use of a splint, plaintiff's wrist injury was clearly visible to all 
those around him.”). 
97 Matson, 631 F.3d at 67 (denying constitutional protection to a disease the court did not 
believe to be serious enough of subject to any intolerance or discrimination).   
 
[2019] NEWMAN, KEEP YOUR FRIENDS CLOSE 13 
 
1. “Serious” and “Embarrassing” are Ambiguous Terms 
 
First, “serious” and “embarrassing” are ambiguous. In the Second Circuit, whether 
the condition is embarrassing enough to warrant protection is an objective question, is 
largely defined by the views of society.98 If the court does not believe a disease is 
attributed to socially repugnant conduct or does not “view[] [the disease] as directly 
associated with any disease which might conceivably be characterized as loathsome,” 
it will refuse to find a right to privacy in the condition and the plaintiff’s subjective 
humiliation would be immaterial.99 The court in Matson rested its determination that 
fibromyalgia lacked this sort of social opprobrium on the wide availability of a drug 
therapy and its being regularly advertised alongside other therapies for conditions the 
court considered not serious.100 However, the Second Circuit fails to consider the 
variations in embarrassment thresholds among individuals and societies.101 What 
constitutes sensitive medical information varies from one person to another, one 
religion to another, and one culture to another.102 Different views may arise “from 
individual patients’ sensitivities or embarrassment thresholds” or from differences in 
religious or cultural beliefs.103 Thus, whether the Second Circuit finds medical 
information constitutionally protected effectively hinges on who is on the jury and in 
what town they live.   
Whether a condition is serious is likewise unclear.104 This confusion is evidenced 
by the Second Circuit’s own inability to develop a consistent definition of “serious.” 
In Doe, the court held that the need for constitutional protection, while near its apex 
when a person suffers from HIV, would be recognized for any serious medical 
condition.105 In Powell, the Second Circuit similarly found that one’s 
transsexualism—like HIV—is a matter “in which the privacy interest is at or near its 
‘zenith.’”106 However, in Matson, the court held that serious, fibromyalgia did not 
reach the bar set in Doe and Powell and adopted a stricter approach “based almost 
                                                           
98 Id. at 66.  
99 See Golub v. Enquirer/Star Group, Inc., 89 N.Y.2d 1074, 1077 (1997) (holding that cancer 
was not societally viewed as “loathsome”).  
100 Matson, 631 F.3d at 67; see also Nordeman, supra notes 89, at 246 (listing “high 
cholesterol, frequent urination, osteoporosis, and acid reflux” as conditions with therapies 
advertised alongside Lyrica).  
101 HEIDI TRANBERG & JEM RASHBASS, MEDICAL RECORDS USE AND ABUSE 62 (2014).  
102 Id.  
103 Id. 
104 Nordeman, supra note 89, at 248 (“The term ‘serious,’ for example, which has already 
been shown to invite a number of different interpretations, needs more clarity if it is to be 
effectively used.”).  
105 Doe, 15 F.2d at 267 (“Clearly, an individual’s choice to inform others that she has 
contracted  . . . a fatal, incurable disease is one that she should normally be allowed to make 
for herself. This would be true for any serious medical condition, but is especially true with 
regard to those infected with HIV.”) (emphasis added). 
106 Matson, 631 F.3d at 67 (Straub, J. dissenting).  
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exclusively on factual comparisons of fibromyalgia to HIV and transsexualism.”107 
The Second Circuit reasoned that fibromyalgia was debilitating only in certain 
instances and was neither fatal like the condition in Doe nor profoundly psychiatric 
like the one in Powell.108 In one ruling, the Second Circuit transformed its zenith of 
seriousness to a threshold.109  
Other definitions of “serious” as related to medical conditions similarly add to the 
confusion. The Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) defines a serious health 
condition as “an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that 
involves: (A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; 
or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider.”110 The Department of Labor 
has promulgated regulations similarly defining “serious health conditions requiring 
continuing treatment.”111 The Committee on Serious and Complex Medical 
Conditions published a list of criteria to be used to determine whether a medical 
condition is serious and complex, including: conditions that are life threatening, cause 
significant pain or discomfort, require frequent monitoring, or affect multiple organ 
systems.112 While both the FMLA and Committee on Serious and Complex Medical 
Conditions either expressly consider or have been interpreted to consider conditions 
such as asthma and arthritis to be serious,113 those suffering from either would unlikely 
be afforded protection in the Second Circuit as neither condition is fatal like HIV nor 
profoundly psychiatric like transsexualism.114  
 
                                                           
107 Id. (“Fibromyalgia, however serious, is neither alleged to be fatal, as we recognized the 
HIV condition to be in Doe nor is it a ‘profound psychiatric disorder’ as we noted in Powell); 
see Nordeman, supra notes 89, at 234 (“Despite having already admitted the serious nature of 
fibromyalgia, the court paradoxically devoted the bulk of its opinion to undermining the 
seriousness of the disease.”).  
108 Matson, 631 F.3d at 65; see also Nordeman, supra note 89, at 234 (“[T]he majority 
compounded much of the dicta from Doe and Powell into a set of requirements that could only 
be met by conditions matching the severity, both physical and mental, of HIV and 
transsexualism.”). 
109 Matson, 631 F.3d at 65. 
110 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2009); FMLA: Serious Health Condition: How do I know if an 
Employee’s Medical Absence Qualifies for FMLA Leave? What is Considered a Serious 
Health Condition?,  SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (Feb. 16, 2016), 
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/toolsandsamples/hrqa/pages/howemployeemedicalab
sencequalifiesforfmlaleave.aspx (listing examples including chronic conditions that require 
periodic visits to a provider, incapacity for pregnancy or prenatal care, permanent or long-term 
conditions, Alzheimer’s, cancer, severe arthritis, and strokes).  
111 29 C.F.R. § 825.115 (2013).  
112 CAROLE A. CHRAVALA & STEVEN SHARFSTEIN, DEFINITION OF SERIOUS AND COMPLEX 
MEDICAL CONDITIONS 19 (1999).  
113 29 C.F.R. § 825.115 (2013); CHRAVALA & SHARFSTEIN, supra note 112, at 19. 
114 Matson, 631 F.3d at 67 (“Fibromyalgia, however serious, is neither alleged to be fatal, as 
we recognized the HIV condition to be in Doe nor is it a ‘profound psychiatric disorder’ as we 
noted in Powell). 
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 2. “Serious” and “Embarrassing” are Subject to Evolve 
 
To make matters even more complicated, a serious condition “may be serious and 
complex for some patients at some points during the course of their disease or 
disability” but not at all times or forever.115 An ailment that at one point was severe in 
nature and surely fatal may over time become quite curable with enough research and 
funding.116 And, as medical conditions become more curable with more widely 
available drug therapies, advertisements for such drug therapies may appear alongside 
those for conditions the court had previously considered not serious.117 With enough 
treatment and enough advertising, over time the loathsome and negative stigmas 
surrounding these conditions may disappear altogether.118 Thus, while the Second 
Circuit has limited precedent guiding their decisions as to what conditions are 
“serious” or “embarrassing,” advances in medicine and technology will inevitably 
make this precedent unreliable and in constant flux. 
 
3.   Jurors and Judges are Not Equipped to Determine the Seriousness of a Condition 
 
Finally, without a more precise definition of serious or factors to guide such a 
determination, the Second Circuit is relying on jurors and judges, likely with little to 
no medical background, to determine on a case-by-case basis whether an individual’s 
condition is serious.119 While the Supreme Court has made it clear that judges have a 
duty to serve as evidentiary gatekeepers with respect to scientific evidence, this duty 
does not come without support.120 Rather, judges are guided by a clear list of factors—
known as the Daubert factors—to help them determine the evidence’s reliability and 
ultimate admissibility.121 Thus, if judges have a duty to serve as gatekeepers tasked 
                                                           
115 CHRAVALA & SHARFSTEIN, supra note 112, at 19.  
116 See Hasina Samji, et al., Closing the Gap: Increases in Life Expectancy among Treated 
HIV-Positive Individuals in the United States and Canada, 8 PLOS ONE e81355 (Dec. 18, 
2013). 
117 Erica Kaufman West, The Problem with “Not an Actual Patient,” OUTWARD (Jan. 7, 
2016), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2016/01/07/_not_an_actual_patient_how_hiv_drug_ads_
reinforce_aids_stigma.html. 
118 Robert Preidt, Life Expectancy with HIV Nears Normal with Treatment, CBS NEWS (May 
11, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/life-expectancy-with-hiv-nears-normal-with-
treatment.  
119 See Nordeman, supra note 89, at 241 (noting that whether the condition was serious is “left 
to the imagination of judges” in the Second Circuit).  
120 See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993); Stephen 
Breyer, Science in the Courtroom, 4 ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECH. (2000), http://issues.org/16-
4/breyer/.  
121 Daubert establishes the Daubert Standard, under which the factors that may be considered 
in determining whether an expert’s methodology is valid are: “(1) whether the theory or 
technique in question can be and has been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer 
review and publication; (3) its known or potential error rate; (4) the existence and 
maintenance of standards controlling its operation; and (5) whether it has attracted widespread 
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with determining whether conditions fall within a category of information protected 
by the Constitution, they should have more than the word “serious” to guide them.122 
Consider a hypothetical individual who has recently been diagnosed with diabetes. 
She is terrified of needles and knows several people who have succumbed to the 
disease. She is struggling to cope with her changed circumstances. Now consider an 
individual who has had diabetes his whole life. He thinks little of his condition, and 
quite frankly, has not known life without it. Now imagine that these two individuals 
are judges sitting on different courts. The first judge may consider diabetes quite 
serious.123 The second, however, would surely not find that his diabetes rises to the 
level of a constitutionally protected ailment established by Second Circuit 
precedent.124 To allow judges or jurors to determine whether a condition is serious, 
without any definition or guidance beyond precedent limited to very few specific 
conditions, is to allow medically untrained triers of fact to rely on their own 
experiences or biases to determine whether an individual has a constitutionally 
protected condition.  
 
B.   The Third Circuit’s More Liberal Approach 
  
The Third Circuit protects information when a claimant asserts a violation of a 
right to privacy which is fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.125 
This verbiage, taken from the landmark personal privacy case Roe v. Wade, has been 
interpreted by the Supreme Court to include rights relating to marriage,126 
procreation,127 contraception,128 family relationships,129 and child rearing.130 Thus far, 
the Third Circuit has considered all medical records and the information therein 
                                                           
acceptance within a relevant scientific community.” Daubert Standard, LEGAL INFORMATION 
INSTITUTE: CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/daubert_standard; 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). 
122 Nordeman, supra notes 89, at 241 (“A more definitive rule would be created if the word 
‘serious’ were simply replaced with a definition.”).  
123 See, e.g., Support Community, AM. DIABETES ASSOC. (Dec. 20, 2016), 
https://community.diabetes.org/discuss/viewtopic/1/11097?post_id=118184 (“[I’m] new to 
this whole diabetes thing and [I’m] scared to death.”). 
124 See, e.g., Bridget Montgomery, Quite Playing the Victim: Why Your Diabetes Shouldn’t 
Define You, THEDIABETESCOUNCIL (Sept. 4, 2018) (“You just happen to be someone with 
diabetes, you are not diabetes.”).  
125 SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1137 (citing Davis, 424 U.S. at 713).  
126 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).  
127 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942).  
128 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (2007).  
129 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).  
130 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).  
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likewise to fall within this scope.131 Consequently, the circuit has extended the right 
to informational privacy to medical records,132 routine testing, X-rays, blood tests, 
pulmonary function tests, hearing and visual tests,133 prescription records,134 
pregnancy status,135 and one’s HIV-positive status.136 This bar, arguably nonexistent 
and quite obviously lower than the one imposed by the Second Circuit, seems to have 
been set by the court in Westinghouse and followed in subsequent cases ever since.137 
While facially overbroad, the Third Circuit still considers the “type of the record 
requested, the information it does or might contain, [and] the potential for harm in any 
subsequent nonconsensual disclosure” when determining whether the state’s interest 
in the information outweighs the individual’s interest in nondisclosure.138  
 
  1.    Medical Information is Generally Afforded Greater Protection  
 
The court in Westinghouse reasoned that medical records are afforded greater 
protection than other materials in American jurisprudence.139 For example, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure “impose a higher burden for discovery of reports of the 
physical and mental condition of a party or other person than for discovery 
generally.”140 Under the Freedom of Information Act, medical files are the subject of 
                                                           
131 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (“Information about one’s body and state of health is matter 
which the individual is ordinarily entitled to retain within ‘the private enclave where he may 
lead a private life.’”).  
132 In re Search Warrant (Sealed), 810 F.2d 67, 71 (3d. Cir. 1987); Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 
577; see also Malleus v. George 641 F.3d 560, 565 (3d. Cir. 2014) (declining to extend the 
right to a report investigating improper physical conduct as it did not contain medical 
information).  
133 Westinghouse., 638 F.2d at 577. 
134 SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1137.  
135 Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 302-03 (3d. Cir. 2000) (holding defendant’s disclosure of 
plaintiff’s pregnancy status “falls squarely within the contours of the recognized right of one 
to be free from disclosure of personal matters . . . but also concerns medical information, 
which [the Third Circuit has] previously held is entitled to this very protection.”).    
136 Doe v. Delie, 257 F.2d 309, 317 (3d Cir. 2001) (granting an inmate a right of privacy in his 
HIV-positive status).  
137 See, e.g., Id. at 317 (“We have long recognized the right to privacy in one’s medical 
information.”). 
138 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (“The factors which should be considered in deciding 
whether an intrusion into an individual's privacy is justified are the type of record requested, 
the information it does or might contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent 
nonconsensual disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record 
was generated, the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the degree of 
need for access, and whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, 
or other recognizable public interest militating toward access.”). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. (comparing FED. R. CIV. P. 35 with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)); see also 8 Wright and Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, §§ 2237, 2238 (1970).  
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a specific exemption.141 This difference in treatment “reflects a recognition that 
information concerning one’s body has a special character.”142  
Further, one need only look to the myriad of laws protecting medical records143 
and doctor-patient confidentiality144 to understand the importance of privacy regarding 
medical information. Yet these laws do not discriminate and afford protection to only 
certain conditions; rather, they expressly prohibit disclosure of “any medical 
information.”145 While they typically focus on healthcare organizations’ duty to 
maintain confidentiality,146 the purpose behind these laws should not be ignored when 
attempting to discern the extent to which state agents should similarly keep 
information private. The laws exist because the professional duty to keep patients’ 
medical information confidential is a well-established doctrine147 based on the idea 
that health information is “among the most private of information.”148 If all medical 
information is protected from disclosure by physicians, permitting disclosure of 
certain conditions once disseminated to a state agent would frustrate the intent of these 
laws and doctrines.  
 
2.    Private and Sensitive are not Synonymous 
 
Additionally, while other circuit courts only find constitutional protection in more 
serious and sensitive information, the Third Circuit draws an important distinction 
                                                           
141 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976).  
142 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577. 
143 EMANUEL HAYT & JONATHAN HAYT, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICAL RECORDS 10 (1964) (“In 
many states, the privacy of the [medical] record is protected by a privileged communications 
statute.”); see O.C.G.A. § 24-12-12 (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2292 (2003); MD. 
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 4-302 (2009).  
144 While the Federal Rules of Evidence does not recognize doctor-patient confidentiality, 
many states have adopted such laws. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2157 (2010); 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.235 (1988).  
145 O.C.G.A. § 24-12-12 (emphasis added).  
146 43 C.F.R. § 164.314 (1996); A GUIDE TO HIPAA SECURITY AND THE LAW 16-17 (Stephen 
S. Wu ed., 2007) (“The scope of parties covered by HIPAA may also cause some confusion. 
HIPAA covers only health plans and health care clearinghouses, organizations that play 
central roles in the processing of claims transactions, as well as health care providers who 
transmit any health information in electronic form in connection with one of the standard 
HIPAA transactions.”).  
147 Rebecca Suarez, Breaching Doctor-Patient Confidentiality: Confusion Among Physicians 
About Involuntary Disclosure of Genetic Information, 21 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 491, 493 
(2012). The Hippocratic Oath, one of the earliest known sets of doctrines for healthcare 
providers, also addresses confidentiality: “Whatever I may see or learn about people in the 
course of my work or in my private life which should not be disclosed I will keep to myself and 
treat in complete confidence . . . ” TONY HOPE, MEDICAL ETHICS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 
90 (2004) (quoting the Hippocratic Oath). 
148 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 177 (2003).  
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between private and sensitive information.149 Medical records, the Third Circuit 
opines, are still private and thus constitutionally protected even in the absence of 
sensitive information therein.150 Thus, while the sensitivity of the information will 
remain a factor in determining whether the government’s interest outweighs the 
individual’s interest in nondisclosure, the Third Circuit removes any hurdle for 
plaintiffs to clear by considering all medical conditions ipso facto private and worthy 
of constitutional protection.151 
To better illustrate this distinction, consider the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution.152 Under the Fourth Amendment, individuals have the right to be secure, 
in both their persons and property, against unreasonable searches and seizures.153 
Thus, without consent from the individual, the state agent seeking to search a person’s 
property must have a legitimate interest; entry into a home without just cause 
“constitutes an unjustified, forcible intrusion that violates the Fourth Amendment.”154 
There is no hurdle a plaintiff must clear to show that his property is of a sensitive or 
important enough caliber in order to be afforded this protection as he is guaranteed 
this privacy protection by the Constitution. To hold otherwise would be akin to 
permitting a search and seizure of insignificant, unimportant items in one’s home 
simply because they are not sensitive and thus not private; citizens would be unable 
to fend off unconstitutional searches of their homes if their homes did not ultimately 
possess anything of interest.  
 
III.    MEDICAL PRIVACY GOING FORWARD  
 
A. Courts Should Protect All Medical Information 
 
Until the Supreme Court clarifies what information is protected by the 
Constitution, courts that have yet to determine what medical information is 
constitutionally protected should follow the Third Circuit in Westinghouse and extend 
protection to all medical information. Adopting any limitation on what types of 
medical information are inherently protected by the Constitution would perpetuate 
inconsistencies across the circuit courts and frustrate a number of public interests. 
 
                                                           
149 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (“This material, although private, is not generally regarded 
as sensitive.”); see Private, Marriam-Webster (defining private as “intended for or restricted 
to the use of a particular person”); but see Sensitive, Marriam-Webster (defining sensitive as 
“calling for tact, care, or caution in treatment”).  
150 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 579 (extending a right of privacy to medical records despite a 
“high degree of sensitivity” therein).  
151 Id. at 577 (“There can be no question that . . . medical records . . . are well within the ambit 
of materials entitled to privacy protection.”). 
152 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
153 Id.  
154 Leon-Velazquez v. State, 269 Ga. App. 760, 761 (2004).  
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1. Courts Should Incentivize Safeguarding Against Inadvertent Information 
Disclosures Rather than Excuse Them 
 
First, interpreting the Constitution as protecting all medical information would 
further society’s interest in keeping medical data private. When courts require 
plaintiffs to prove their medical condition meets some threshold in order to be 
constitutionally protected, necessarily some conditions are protected and others are 
not. There are two primary issues with this approach. First, this would allow the 
government to acquire any non-constitutionally protected medical information despite 
having no need for it. Second, even if a state agent properly acquired the information, 
he may inadvertently or recklessly disclose the information and still be immune from 
suit if, again, the information did not rise to a level of constitutional protection. In 
courts like the Sixth Circuit that hardly protect any medical information, this approach 
has led to the blatant publishing of an individual’s HIV status in a local newspaper 
with no repercussion for the government agent responsible nor recourse for the 
individual whose privacy had been violated.155  
Instead, courts should interpret the Constitution as protecting all medical data to 
incentivize safeguarding against improper disclosures. In this day and age, inadvertent 
and intentional dissemination of medical information is rampant.156 With the 
expanding use of electronic medical records157 and the pervasiveness of data theft, 
breaches, and improper disclosure,158 those in possession of intimate information 
should be incentivized to protect it. By effectively excusing the government for 
wrongfully disseminating sensitive medical data simply because the information did 
not rise to the level of Constitutional protection, the government would have less of 
an incentive to implement safeguards to ensure that its agents were keeping records 
and the information therein secure.  
Relevant case law supports this contention. The court in Whalen relied on the New 
York Health Department’s security provisions in the statute and the remote possibility 
that the employees would fail to maintain proper security of the information to find 
                                                           
155 Lockwood, 1996 WL 367046, at *6 (“In fact the first words in the article were John Doe’s 
first and last names, and his name appeared numerous times throughout the article.”).  
156 Jim Avila & Serena Marshall, Your Medical Records May Not be Private: ABC News 
Investigation, ABC NEWS (Sept. 13, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/medical-records-
private-abc-news-investigation/story?id=17228986 (“Many of the breaches occur through 
theft or hacking of a computer that contains medical records, loss of the records or unknown 
reasons.”).  
157 Richard F. Gillum, From Papyrus to the Electronic Tablet: A Brief History of the Clinical 
Medical Record with Lessons for the Digital Age, 126 AM. J. MED. 853, 856 (Oct. 2013) 
(noting over 50% of physicians reported using electronic medical records in 2011).  
158 Suanu Bliss Wikina, What Caused the Breach? An Examination of Use of Information 
Technology and Heatlh Data Breaches, PERSPECTIVES IN HEALTH INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT (Oct. 1, 2014) (“Data breaches arising from theft, loss, unauthorized 
access/disclosure, improper disclosure, or hacking incidents involving personal health 
information continue to increase every year.”); Nicolas Terry, Health Privacy is Difficult but 
Not Impossible in a Post-HIPAA Data-Driven World, 146 CHEST 835, 836 (“Medical data 
theft has been steadily increasing, with the health-care sector becoming the leading target for 
cyberattacks in 2013.”).  
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that no invasion of a constitutional right to privacy had occurred.159 Additionally, the 
court in Westinghouse considered what safeguards the state had implemented to 
protect the data in its seven-part balancing test to determine whether the government’s 
interest in the protected information outweighed the individual’s interest in 
nondisclosure.160 Thus, in order to even first acquire the information, the government 
agency in Westinghouse needed to prove that its “procedures of safekeeping the 
records . . . represent[ed] sufficiently adequate assurance of non-disclosure.”161  
Federal laws additionally support the idea of safeguarding medical information.162 
When thinking about patient privacy, one of the laws that generally first comes to 
mind is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).163 HIPAA 
requires all covered entities—any healthcare providers, healthcare clearinghouses, 
health plans, and insurers—to ensure the confidentiality of protected health 
information (PHI).164 HIPAA also requires covered entities that share PHI with 
business associates to obtain “satisfactory assurances that the business associates will 
safeguard all PHI.”165 A business associate is a “person or entity that performs certain 
functions or activities that involve the use or disclosure of protected health information 
on behalf of, or provides services to, a covered entity.”166 Examples include “legal, 
accounting, consulting, data aggregation, management, and financial services 
firms.”167 Business associates are required to use the information only as “permitted 
and described in the binding agreement with the [covered associate]”168 in order to 
protect information that would be PHI as though it were possessed by a covered 
entity.169 While historically the HIPAA Privacy Rule only held covered entities liable 
for compliance failures, the OCR pursued its first action against a business associate 
in 2016 for failing to impose sufficient policies to protect the PHI.170 Of note, the OCR 
seeks penalties for just that: the failure to protect PHI, not the failure to protect certain 
PHI.   
                                                           
159 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 601 (“There is no support in the record, or in the experience of the two 
States that New York has emulated, for an assumption that the security provisions of the 
statute will be administered improperly.”).  
160 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (considering “the adequacy of safeguards to prevent 
unauthorized disclosure.”).  
161 Id. 
162 24 C.F.R. § 164.303 (1996).    
163 John R. Clark, The Erosion of Privacy, 34 AIR MED. J. 240, 241 (Sept. 2015).  
164 24 C.F.R. § 164.303 (1996).   
165 Mark Bryant & Dominic G. Zerbi, Managing HIPAA Business Associate Compliance 
Efforts, 94 J. NAT’L. MED. ASSOC. 290, 291 (May 2002).  
166 Carolina Curby-Lucier, OCR Clarifies Role of a Business Associate Under HIPAA Privacy 
Rule, ONRAMP (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.onr.com/blog/ocr-clarifies-role-of-a-business-
associate-under-hipaa-privacy-rule/.  
167  Id.  
168 Curby-Lucier, supra note 166. 
169 Wu, supra note 146, at 18–19.  
170 Curby-Lucier, supra note 166.  
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When a governmental body receives health information from a covered entity, it 
may be considered a business associate, subjecting the body to these federal privacy 
laws. However, even if the governmental body was not considered a business 
associate, HIPAA encourages third-party safeguarding to the extent it may do so under 
statutory authority.171 Thus, to allow government agencies to disseminate medical 
information with no recourse would completely frustrate the purpose of HIPAA. 
Medical information that did not rise to the level of constitutional protection would be 
highly regulated and highly protected while in the hospital’s possession but afforded 
no protection once sent to a governmental body. Moreover, state agents—possessing 
the same information as physicians—would be held to a much lower standard than 
physicians with respect to safeguarding medical information. Surely, if a physician 
took to the newspapers or social media and disclosed his patients’ confidential 
information in a comparable manner, the public would be in uproar.172 
A September 2011 report by the Health Research Institute likewise encourages 
those in possession of medical data to protect it.173 The report noted that more than 
half of covered entities surveyed had reported at least one breach in the last two 
years.174 To “bridge the gap between situations not specifically addressed under 
current regulations,” the report proposed a number of strategies.175 Notably, it 
recommended that covered entities adopt certain privacy or security controls that 
business associates must agree to before they are eligible to work with the covered 
entity. The report additionally recommended that all employees receive better training 
and education on privacy and that covered entities hold their employees accountable 
in order to “create a culture of confidentiality where everyone is responsible for 
adhering to privacy standards.”176  
The preceding examples are only a few of the cases, laws, and reports that endorse 
the protection of health data. One need only google “medical privacy” or “keep 
medical information private” to find numerous other sources calling for the same goal: 
the safeguarding of medical data. Constitutionally protecting all medical data, as 
opposed to permitting its disclosure, would be one more strategy to achieve that goal.  
 
 
 
                                                           
171 Has the Secretary Exceeded the HIPAA Statutory Authority by Requiring “Satisfactory 
Assurances” for Disclosures to Business Associates?, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (July 26, 
2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/232/may-i-notify-parents-before-
treating-child/index.html.  
172 Alleged Social Media Retaliation by Doctor Breached HIPAA Privacy Rule, HIPAA J. 
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173  Report Addresses Identity Theft and Security Breach Strategies for the Health Care 
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2. Protecting all Medical Information Simplifies the Courts’ Balancing Test 
 
In addition to furthering society’s interest in protecting medical information, 
protecting all medical data simplifies courts’ role in determining whether there is a 
constitutional violation. Currently, most circuit courts must perform two balancing 
tests. First, they must determine whether the medical condition is of a constitutionally 
protected dimension, and if it is, then they must determine whether the government 
has a legitimate interest in the information that outweighs the individual's interest in 
nondisclosure.177 By categorically considering medical information protected, courts 
would only need to perform the latter test. This simplified balancing test would reduce 
inconsistencies between the circuit courts as to which ailments are constitutionally 
protected and which are not. No longer could one court extend protection to an 
individual’s HIV status while another permitted its improper disclosure. One’s HIV 
status would be categorically protected as medical information and thus courts would 
begin straightaway with evaluating the government’s interest in the information. 
While this ruling would seemingly protect anything from an individual’s HIV status 
to his sprained pinky toe, the seriousness of the ailment would still be considered in 
the second balancing test.178 The less serious the ailment and the less potential for 
harm in any subsequent disclosure, the greater the likelihood that the intrusion into an 
individual’s privacy would be justified.179 Thus, courts like the Second and Sixth 
Circuits that are reluctant to extend privacy protections to less serious diseases or those 
not fundamentally private would be assured that the government would still likely be 
permitted to acquire the information so long as they rightly need it. 
 
3. Patients May be Less Forthcoming if They are Unsure Whether Their Information 
is Protected 
 
Lastly, patients have an expectation that their medical information will remain 
private.180 If the courts have thus far been unable to reach a consensus as to what 
information is protected, the patients whose information risks dissemination must 
likewise be confused. Permitting baseless acquisition and dissemination of personal 
                                                           
177 Lee, 636 F.3d at 260 (“Only after a fundamental right is identified should the court proceed 
to the next step of the analysis—the balancing of the government’s interest in disseminating 
the information against the individual’s interest in keeping the information private.”); Ortlieb, 
74 F. App’x at 857 (refusing to consider whether the government’s interest outweighed the 
plaintiff’s right to privacy where plaintiff had no right to privacy in her x-rays). 
178 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (“The factors which should be considered in deciding whether 
an intrusion into an individual's privacy is justified are the type of record requested, the 
information it does or might contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual 
disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated, the 
adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the degree of need for access, and 
whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable 
public interest militating toward access.”); see also SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1140 (“Westinghouse 
mandates a consideration of seven different factors.”). 
179 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.  
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medical information may deter patients from seeking the care they need or erode trust 
and candor with medical providers when patients are unsure what portions of their 
record are susceptible to acquisition or dissemination.181 
The court in Whalen so conceded that “[u]nquestionably, some individuals’ 
concern for their own privacy may lead them to avoid or to postpone needed medical 
attention.”182 A study conducted by the Office of the National Coordinator for Health 
Information Technology quantified this concern and found that in 2013, 75% of 
individuals surveyed were very or somewhat concerned with the privacy of their 
medical information.183 Roughly 8% admitted to having withheld information from 
their healthcare providers due to their concerns with the privacy of their medical 
information.184 These numbers reflect concerns with the privacy of information stored 
in electronic medical records, an arena strictly regulated with little confusion as to 
what is or is not protected from disclosure. Thus, it takes no stretch of the imagination 
to predict even higher numbers should individuals be made more aware of state agents’ 
ability in certain jurisdictions to improperly acquire or disclose information with no 
liability. By considering all medical information protected by the Constitution, courts 
have the ability to temper people’s concerns over the privacy of their medical 
information.  
 
B.   Congress Should Amend the Privacy Act to Permit Recovery for Emotional 
Distress 
 
Additionally, Congress should amend the Privacy Act to expressly permit recovery 
for mental or emotional distress when state agents fail to properly handle medical 
information. Doing so creates an alternative remedy for individuals in the Second and 
Sixth Circuits who are afforded very little protection under the Constitution due to the 
courts’ narrow interpretations of what medical conditions are protected under Whalen. 
The Privacy Act of 1974 was passed in the “wake of the Watergate scandal in order 
to regulate the treatment of personal information by the federal government.”185 The 
Act places a number of limitations on federal agencies’ abilities to “disclose, maintain, 
collect, and use information.”186 Specifically, it authorizes individuals to bring a civil 
action and recover actual damages when an Executive Branch agency intentionally or 
                                                           
181 Tasha Glenn & Scott Monteith, Privacy in the Digital World: Medical and Health Data 
Outside of HIPAA Protections, CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REPORTS 493, 493 (Sept. 14, 2014) 
(“Trust between doctor and patient is fundamental to the practice of medicine. A patient must 
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willfully fails to manage confidential records “in such a way as to have an adverse 
effect on an individual.”187 However, the Supreme Court declined to interpret “actual 
damages” as including damages for mental or emotional distress in Federal Aviation 
Administration v. Cooper.188 The Court felt the term “actual damages” was ambiguous 
and held that Congress must have intended that the term mean special damages for 
proven pecuniary loss because Congress had declined to authorize general damages.189 
The issue with limiting “actual damages” to pecuniary losses is that the “primary, and 
often only, damages sustained as a result of an invasion of privacy” are mental or 
emotional distress.190 Consequently, the Supreme Court “drastically limite[ed] the 
situations that result in government liability.”191 Not only must a plaintiff prove the 
disclosure was willful, but she also must have suffered actual damage for which she 
can be compensated such as physical injury or a job termination. Therefore, plaintiffs 
who have fallen victim to inadvertent breaches or those who suffered only “torment, 
anxiety, and . . . emotional stress wondering if and when this information will be used 
against them” are effectively left with the Constitution as their only option for 
recourse.192  
Thus, Congress should amend the Privacy Act to explicitly include damages for 
mental or emotional distress. While this solution would not necessarily provide 
recourse for those filing suit for an inadvertent disclosure of medical information, it 
would provide an alternative remedy for individuals in the Second and Sixth Circuits 
whose medical information has been intentionally disseminated by the government, 
even if their information did not rise to a constitutionally protected dimension. Until 
there is consistency among the circuit courts as to what medical information is 
constitutionally protected, permitting recovery for emotional distress under the 
Privacy Act would at least level the playing field for those afforded little ability to sue 
under the Constitution.  
 
CONCLUSION 
  
The increasing use of electronic medical records and the ease with which highly 
personal data may be wrongfully disseminated, stolen, or victim to breach has brought 
much needed attention to the issue of informational privacy.193 While there is 
extensive legislation and literature discussing the issue of privacy in the doctor-patient 
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190 Id. at 304 (Sotomayer, J. dissenting) (“Consequently, individuals can no longer recover 
what our precedents and common sense understand to be the primary, and often only, 
damages sustained as a result of an invasion of privacy, namely mental or emotional 
distress.”).  
191 Seeley, supra note 25, at 1366.  
192 Rutherford, supra note 7, at 202.  
193 Seeley, supra note 25, at 1355 (“Data breaches occur with increasing regulatiry, leading 
some to question if the current statutory and regulatory schemes properly incentivize the 
maintenance of adequate security measures amongst federal agencies.”).  
 
26 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 32:1] 
 
arena, the extent to which government agencies must protect sensitive medical 
information under the constitutional right to privacy remains far from settled.194 The 
bulk of the confusion arises from an inability among circuit courts to determine which 
medical conditions are protected under the Constitution.  
Until the Supreme Court resolves this circuit split, courts that have not yet adopted 
a stance as to what medical information is constitutionally protected should follow the 
Third Circuit and protect all medical information. Considering all medical data 
protected by the Constitution would not only incentivize government agencies to 
safeguard the information, but it would temper the public’s already present concern 
with data theft and breach. Additionally, Congress should amend the Privacy Act to 
expressly permit recovery of damages for emotional or mental distress as these 
damages are the primary and often only damages suffered from an invasion of privacy. 
Individuals living in the Second and Sixth Circuits⎯with narrow interpretations of 
what medical information is constitutionally protected⎯are without recourse under 
the Constitution should their medical conditions not rise to a certain threshold. By 
amending the Privacy Act to expressly include damages for emotional or mental 
distress, Congress would be granting these citizens an ability to recover what they 
would otherwise not have. 
 
                                                           
194 Gilbert, supra note 27, at 1375. 
